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Abstract
Background: Biosecurity routines at herd level may reduce the probability of introduction of disease into the herd,
but some measures may be regarded as expensive and cumbersome for the farmers. Custom-made measures based
on individual farm characteristics may aid in improving the actual application of on-farm biosecurity.
The aim of the study was to provide a tool for calculating the effects of different biosecurity measures and strategies
on the individual farm level.
A simple model was developed to assess the risk of disease introduction and the need for biosecurity measures in
individual farms. To illustrate the general applicability of the tool, it was applied to theoretical examples of
Swedish cattle and pig farms and diseases endemic in those animal species in the EU, in two scenarios with
different between-farm contact patterns.
Results: The model illustrated that the most important factors affecting the risk, and the effect of biosecurity
measures such as quarantine routines and protective clothing, were the frequency of between-farm contacts and
prevalence of the disease. The risk of introduction as well as the effect of biosecurity measures differed between
farm types and disease transmission routes. Adapting contact patterns to mitigate a specific disease risk was as
important as biosecurity measures for some farm types, but the largest effect was seen when combining
biosecurity measures with more planned contact patterns.
Conclusions: The risk assessment model proved useful for illustrating the risk of introduction of endemic
diseases and the mitigating effect of different biosecurity measures on farm level. Model outputs could be used
to justify prioritisation of measures or adapting contact patterns. The theoretic exercise of adjusting model inputs
and comparing outputs may help veterinary advisors to understand farm-specific risks and motivate farmers to
improve biosecurity in their individual farm, as it can be tailored to each farmer’s needs and preferences.
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Background
Endemic as well as exotic contagious diseases may cause
devastating outbreaks in individual herds of livestock. In-
fectious agents may be transmitted between farms by vari-
ous routes such as live animals, trucks and other vehicles,
people, aerosols, fomites, wildlife and insect vectors [1].
The frequency and contact patterns of these transmission
routes are important determinants for the risk of disease
introduction and thus also important for the epidemio-
logical investigation of a disease outbreak [2].
Biosecurity routines at herd level may reduce the
probability of introduction of disease into the herd. For
example, the prevalence of Aujezsky’s disease, porcine
reproductive and respiratory syndrome, Mycoplasma
hyopneumoniae, bovine coronavirus, and infectious bo-
vine rhinotracheitis has been associated with the level of
biosecurity at farm level [3–7]. Following the Swedish
ban of antimicrobial feed additives in 1986, arising prob-
lems with infectious diseases in pig herds were mainly con-
trolled by improving external and internal biosecurity in
the production [8, 9]. Conversely, a high prevalence of in-
fectious diseases has been used as a proxy for low biosecur-
ity [10]. As most diseases have a negative impact on the
well-being of the animals, their productivity and thereby
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also the economy of the farmer, there are incentives for
stringent biosecurity routines. The new European Animal
Health Regulation emphasises the responsibility of farmers
for preventive measures, including on-farm biosecurity, in
order to control contagious diseases within the European
Union (EU) [11]. New Swedish legislation on the preven-
tion of zoonoses also puts responsibility on farmers for
providing biosecurity measures to prevent spread of
zoonotic agents to and from people visiting their farm
[12] and Danish legislation requires all farmers with
large dairy holdings to set up an approved biosecurity
plan for their herd [13]. Moreover, disease prevention
in the form of improved on-farm biosecurity plays a
part in many national and regional initiatives within the
EU. These efforts to turn disease control towards on-
farm prevention put extra demands on the advisory
function of the veterinary profession. A risk assessment
tool could be helpful in developing skills in risk-based
prioritisation of external farm biosecurity measures
among veterinary practitioners and achieving a trustful
dialogue with farmers on biosecurity.
Farmers may regard biosecurity measures as expen-
sive and cumbersome and the biosecurity routines on
farm level are not always optimal [13–17]. Moreover,
prioritisation of measures based on individual farm
characteristics may aid in improving the actual applica-
tion of on-farm biosecurity. Farmers may want to dis-
cuss different biosecurity measures separately, to justify
investments in time and money, but estimates of the
preventive effect of individual measures in different sit-
uations are difficult to obtain.
The aim of this study was to create a tool for on-farm
risk based prioritisation of commonly recommended
biosecurity measures, as an aid to veterinarians, animal
health organisations and farmers in their strategies to
improve on-farm biosecurity.
Methods
A simple model was used to assess the risk of disease
introduction, the need for and potential effect of biose-
curity measures in individual farms. To illustrate the
general applicability of the tool, it was applied to theor-
etical examples of Swedish cattle and pig farms and dis-
eases endemic in those animal species in the EU. The
tool was created as a stochastic model. A deterministic
version of the model was also built, in order to assess
whether an expensive simulation software tool was really
needed. A deterministic model may be more user-
friendly, depending on the number of replicates needed
to assess the impact of each input parameter.
Input data included yearly number of the most common
between-farm contacts that may potentially introduce each
of the chosen diseases on each theoretical farm. These
contacts included live animals, animal transport vehicles,
deadstock collectors, visits by veterinarians, animal techni-
cians performing artificial insemination (AI technicians)
and hoof trimmers.
The predicted yearly numbers of different contacts
were obtained from farmers’ organisations and official
records.
A literature review did not provide a sufficient basis
for the other necessary input parameters and, hence, ex-
pert opinion of eight of the authors was used for the se-
lection of relevant diseases and probability estimates.
The experts were selected by the first author, from the
National Veterinary Institute and the Swedish University
of Agricultural Sciences, the organisations providing
most of the research and advice on bovine and porcine
infectious diseases in Sweden, with the aim to create an
expert group with a combination of solid scientific and
clinical experience. The basis presented to the experts
for the selection of diseases was infections that are im-
portant for cattle and pig production in the EU, and
where the experts had available scientific data and per-
sonal experience on which to base their estimates. Input
parameters included the probability of introduction of
each disease via different between-farm contacts and the
expected risk reduction by each biosecurity measure.
The biosecurity measures evaluated were those com-
monly recommended to farmers: quarantine for all intro-
duced animals (3 weeks for pigs and 4 weeks for cattle,
based on current practice on Swedish farms), not allowing
livestock truck drivers and deadstock collectors into the
animal building (biosecurity lock for loading animals and
isolated outside area for animal carcasses), and providing
protective clothing and boots for all visitors, plus a farm-
specific hoof-trimming crush. To provide a reasonable
overview of the use of the model tool, the measures were
combined in two different scenarios for each herd.
Cattle
The infectious agents used in the models were bovine re-
spiratory syncytial virus (BRSV) and bovine coronavirus
(BCoV). Three theoretical farm examples were used, to re-
flect the most common production systems in Sweden:
one dairy farm, one specialised calf fattening farm and one
suckler cow farm. The dairy farm was set to include 180
milking cows, the two beef farms had 120 fattening calves
and 65 suckler cows, respectively.
Pigs
The infectious agents used in the models were Brachyspira
hyodysenteriae causing swine dysentery and Mycoplasma
hyopneumoniae causing swine enzootic pneumonia. The
theoretical farm examples used were one specialised fatten-
ing herd with 1600 fattening pigs and one farrow-to finish
herd with 484 sows where it was assumed that all pigs were
reared to market weight on the farm. No specialised piglet-
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producing herd was included as, from the aspects relevant
to this study, it would have been fairly similar to the
farrow-to-finish herd.
Scenarios
Two different scenarios, baseline and low-risk, were
used to reflect different practices of between-farm con-
tacts, as adapting contact patterns can also be seen as
part of a farm’s biosecurity strategy.
Information about typical farms and farm practices
was supplied by the Swedish Animal Health Services for
pig and beef herds, and by Växa Sweden for the dairy
herd.
The baseline scenario included the predicted yearly
contacts in a typical farm of each type. In the low-risk
scenario, it was assumed that artificial insemination (AI)
in the dairy herd was performed by someone on the
farm (i.e. no visit from an AI technician) and that re-
placement heifers were bred on the farm. In the low-risk
scenario for the suckler herd, the number of introduced
animals was reduced. In the low-risk scenario for the pig
herds and the calf fattening herd, the number of source
herds for live animals was reduced. Moreover, in this
scenario a lower prevalence estimate was used for the
cattle diseases as it was assumed that the farmers chose
to mainly buy animals during the outdoor season when
the prevalences of the selected diseases are lower.
The estimated numbers of yearly between-farm con-
tacts for each farm in the two scenarios are specified in
Table 1a, b.
Input parameters
The expert opinions were elicited by group discussions
led by the first author and held separately for the cattle
and pig experts, respectively. Within the two expert
groups, each disease was discussed separately, with each
route of disease introduction and the effect of respective
biosecurity measures discussed in a systematic order.
The outline of the model where the input parameters
were to be used was explained to the experts. For prob-
ability of introduction via different routes, the experts
were instructed to take different levels of compliance
into account. For each parameter, maximum and mini-
mum values were chosen first, by open discussion be-
tween all the four experts on each animal species.
Subsequently a probability distribution was decided. If
the experts agreed that the relevant parameter was just as
likely to equal any value between maximum and mini-
mum, a uniform distribution was chosen, and if a most
likely value was put forward, a Beta pert distribution was
chosen. Scientific data and the experts’ own (clinical and
field research) experiences were discussed in detail in order
to agree on each parameter. All input parameters were
subsequently re-evaluated individually by each expert, with
Table 1 Theoretical number of different contacts per year in 5 example herds
a. Examples included three cattle herds and two pig herds. Input values used in the baseline scenario












10 2 108, in 18 batches 200, in 20 batches 5200, in 26 batches
Animal transport
vehiclesb
25 3 20 60 52
Deadstock
collections
17 2 3 25 5
AI technician 280 NAc NA NA NA
Veterinarian 20 2 4 12 6
Hoof trimmer 2 1 NA NA NA
b. Examples included three cattle herds and two pig herds. Input values used in the low-risk scenario
Introduced live
animalsa
1 1 100, in 5 batches 100, in 10 batches 5200, in 13 batches
Animal transport
vehiclesb
20 3 16 50 26
Deadstock
collections
15 2 3 20 5
AI technician 0 NAc NA NA NA
Veterinarian 20 2 4 12 6
Hoof trimmer 2 1 NA NA NA
a If number of batches not specified, animals could be introduced from any herd and no sourcing from a limited number of herds was assumed
b Total number of transport vehicles, including those that collect animals from the farm
c NA = Not applicable
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the explicit instruction to review the previously agreed
values. All estimates (including probability distributions) of
probability of introduction and percentage risk reduction
are listed in Table 2, while the disease prevalences used are
given in Table 3. The probability of introduction assumes
that the contact comes directly from an infected farm. The
varying of the figures for within-herd prevalence between
one infected animal and a maximum number of concur-
rently infected (and infectious) animals in a uniform distri-
bution was based on the assumption that the contact
could occur in any phase of the infection. Maximum
prevalence values were adjusted by the experts from pub-
lished data [18–22], based on their own experience, to ob-
tain a value representative of the maximum proportion of
infected animals in the incubation or excreting phase of
the infection, at the same point in time, in a Swedish herd.
Models
The calculations were performed in a spreadsheet. A risk
assessment model structure assuming independent prob-
abilities was used [23]. The probability of introduction of
a specific disease agent via a certain contact, R(contact),
was calculated as:
R contactð Þ ¼ P1P2
Where P1 = the probability of introduction via this
contact with no mitigation, and
P2 = 1-effect of the biosecurity measure (i.e. probability
of failure of a certain biosecurity measure, see Table 2
for the estimated effect of each measure).
For indirect contacts (people and vehicles) P1 was cal-
culated as the probability of encountering the infectious
agent (=herd prevalence) * probability of transmission
via the specific contact (see Tables 2 and 3).
For live animals P1 was calculated as herd prevalen-
ce*within-herd prevalence.
The yearly risk of introducing each disease via each in-
direct contact type (R(year)) was calculated as:
R yearð Þ ¼ 1‐ 1‐R contactð Þð Þ
Where x = number of each type of contact during a
1-year period.
For live animals that were moved in batches, the yearly
risk was calculated as (1 ‐ (1 ‐ herd prevalence)n batches) ×
(1 ‐ (1 ‐within ‐ herd prevalence)n animals/batch) to account
for the limited number of source herds, with subsequent
multiplication by (1-the effect of quarantine measures).
Here it was assumed that all animals in one batch were
sourced from the same herd at the same point in time.
Different batches could come from different source herds
or the same herd at different times (when the infection
status of the source herd might be different).
Each route of introduction was calculated separately
and subsequently combined to describe the yearly risk of
introducing each disease (R(total)) depending on differ-
ent biosecurity measures as:
R totalð Þ ¼ 1‐ 1‐R ið Þð Þ 1‐R jð Þð Þ
Where R(i-j) = yearly risk of introduction (as calculated
previously) via each contact type, with or without biose-
curity measures. All equations are detailed in Table 4.
Two separate versions of the model were created for
each disease in each type of herd, based on the two dif-
ferent scenarios. The model was created in Microsoft®
Excel (Microsoft Co., Redmond USA) and Monte Carlo
Table 2 Probability input parameters
BRSV BCoV SD M. hyo
Contact % % % %
Animal transport vehiclesa 0-30-80 (Beta Pert) 1-40-95 (Beta Pert) 0-3-40 (Beta Pert) 0-40 (uniform)
Deadstock collectorsa 0-3-80 (Beta Pert) 0-5-95 (Beta Pert) 0-0.1 (uniform) 0-0.1 (uniform)
Visitor (vet, AI technician)a 0-40-80 (Beta Pert) 1-50-95 (Beta Pert) 0-0.1-5 (Beta Pert) 0-0.01-1 (Beta Pert)
Hoof trimmera 0-40-80 (Beta Pert) 1-80-95 (Beta Pert) NAc NA
Biosecurity measure
3–4 weeks’ quarantineb 0-50-99 (Beta Pert) 0-20-99 (Beta Pert) 20-50-50.1 (Beta Pert) 70-89-90 (Beta Pert)
Biosecurity lock for loading, ventilation off while truck outside 50-90 (uniform) 50-90 (uniform) 100 80-90-99 (Beta Pert)
Isolated area for carcasses 99-99.5 (uniform) 99-99.5 (uniform) 100 100
Protective clothing provided for visitors 50-80 (uniform) 50-75 (uniform) 90-99-100 (Beta Pert) 95-100 (uniform)
Farm provides hoof trimming crush 50-80 (uniform) 50-80 (uniform) NA NA
Introduction of bovine respiratory syncytial virus (BRSV) and bovine coronavirus (BCoV) in cattle herds, swine dysentery (SD) and Mycoplasma hyopneumoniae (M.
hyo) in pig herds, via different contacts that come directly from an infected farm). Level of risk reduction by different biosecurity measures. Percentage figures
represent minimum-most likely-maximum values or minimum-maximum values. Probability distributions shown in brackets
a assuming contact with diseased animals, thus multiplied by herd prevalence in the models
b 3 weeks in pig herds, 4 weeks in cattle herds
c NA = not applicable
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simulations were performed in @Risk (Palisade Co.,
Ithaca, USA). Each simulation was run in 10 000
iterations.
In order to assess the value of the stochastic aspect of
the model, deterministic model versions were also built. In
these model versions, all input parameters were fixed at
the most likely value or, where a uniform distribution had
been used, the average of the maximum and minimum
value.
Sensitivity analysis of the effect of the various input
parameters was performed using tornado graphs as well
as changing the fixed input values.
Table 3 Prevalence input parameters
BRSV BCoV SD M. hyo
Herd prevalence (%) 0.5-20-50 ina 0.5-30-50 in 0-4b 50-98
0.5-2-50 out 0.5-3-50 out 0-0.5 (gilt) 40-70 (gilt)
(Beta Pert) (Beta pert) (uniform) (uniform)
Within-herd prevalence 1/nc-1 1/n-1 1/n-0.5 1/n-0.4
(uniform) (uniform) (uniform) (uniform)
Estimates used for the prevalence of bovine respiratory syncytial virus (BRSV) and bovine coronavirus (BCoV) in cattle herds, and swine dysentery (SD) and
Mycoplasma hyopneumoniae (M. hyo) in pig herds. Percentage figures given represent minimum-most likely-maximum values or minimum-maximum values.
Probability distributions shown in brackets
a in = indoor season, out = pasture season
b Different herd prevalences are given for ordinary herds and gilt-producing herds, as the latter have a lower prevalence (free from dysentery, but might be infected
during transport)
c n = number of animals in an average source herd for each specific animal type (gilt producers 765 animals, grower producers 3000, dairy heifer producers and
bull calves 500, beef heifers 900)
Table 4 Equations used for calculating the probabilities included in the model
Yearly risk of introduction (R)
via:
Input parameters Equation
1 Individual live animals Herd prevalence (HP), within-herd prevalence (WHP), ani-
mals introduced yearly (n)
R = 1 ‐ (1 ‐ (HP*WHP))n
2 Individual live animals, despite
biosecurity
HP, WHP, n, effect of quarantine (Q) R = 1 ‐ (1 ‐ (HP*WHP)*(1 ‐ Q))n
3 Animals in batches HP, WHP, n, yearly number of batches (batch) R = (1 ‐ (1 ‐ HP)batch) × (1 ‐ (1 ‐ WHP)n/batch)
4 Animals in batches, despite
biosecurity
HP, WHP, n, batch, Q R = (1 ‐ (1 ‐ HP)batch) × (1 ‐ (1 ‐ WHP)n/batch)*(1 ‐ Q)
5 Animal transport vehicles HP, probability of transmission via transport (trp), yearly
transports (n)
R = 1 ‐ (1 ‐ (HP*trp))n
6 Animal transport vehicles,
despite biosecurity
HP, TRP, n, effect of biosecurity routine (biosec) R = 1 ‐ (1 ‐ (HP*trp)*(1 ‐ biosec))n
7 Deadstock collector HP, probability of transmission via deadstock collector
(dead), yearly collections (n)
R = 1 ‐ (1 ‐ (HP*dead))n
8 Deadstock collector, despite
biosecurity
HP, dead, n, biosec R = 1 ‐ (1 ‐ (HP*dead)*(1 ‐ biosec))n
9 AI technician HP, probability of transmission via technician (AI), yearly
visits (n)
R = 1 ‐ (1 ‐ (HP*AI))n
10 AI technician, despite
biosecurity
HP, AI, n, biosec R = 1 ‐ (1 ‐ (HP*AI)*(1 ‐ biosec))n
11 Veterinarian HP, probability of transmission via veterinarian (vet), yearly
visits (n)
R = 1 ‐ (1 ‐ (HP*vet))n
12 Veterinarian, despite biosecurity HP, vet, n, biosec R = 1 ‐ (1 ‐ (HP*vet)*(1 ‐ biosec))n
13 Hoof trimmer HP, probability of transmission via hoof trimmer (hoof),
yearly visits (n)
R = 1 ‐ (1 ‐ (HP*hoof))n
14 Hoof trimmer, despite
biosecurity
HP, hoof, n, biosec R = 1 ‐ (1 ‐ (HP*hoof)*(1 ‐ biosec))n
15 All contacts Equations 1 (or 3), 5, 7, 9, 11, 13 R = 1 ‐ (1 ‐ Equ1)*(1 ‐ Equ5)*(1 ‐ Equ7)*(1 ‐
Equ9)*(1 ‐ Equ11)*(1 ‐ Equ13)
14 All contacts, despite biosecurity Equiations 2 (or 4), 6, 8, 10, 12, 14 R = 1 ‐ (1 ‐ Equ2)*(1 ‐ Equ6)*(1 ‐ Equ7)*(1 ‐
Equ10)*(1 ‐ Equ12)*(1 ‐ Equ14)
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Results and discussion
The results appear to be in accordance with the under-
lying mechanisms that influence the risk of disease
introduction to different types of farms.
Cattle
The results for the yearly risk of introduction of each
disease in the dairy and calf fattening herds in the sto-
chastic versions of the model are shown in Table 5. The
results from the beef suckler herd are illustrated in Fig. 1.
This figure also includes outputs from the deterministic
model versions. Overall, the results indicate risk redu-
cing effects of biosecurity measures as well as of chan-
ged contact patterns.
The outputs in the baseline scenario for the dairy herd
in particular, but also the calf fattening herd, indicate a
very high risk of introduction, regardless of the applica-
tion of biosecurity measures. This is due to the high
maximum estimates for herd prevalence and within-
herd prevalence in combination with high contact rates
and a high maximum probability of introduction via
these contacts. These results could be seen as realistic
for a farm located in the high-prevalence areas in the
southern parts of Sweden [24], with a high cattle density,
but would not be realistic for farms in other areas. Even
in herds with a high number of visitors (mainly AI tech-
nicians) in areas with a high prevalence, a protective
effect of biosecurity measures has been noted [6], dem-
onstrating that a high risk estimate is not absolute. The
minimum values were substantially (50 %) lower than
the 5th percentile, reflecting a lower probability if biose-
curity measures were diligently applied. The lower prob-
ability of introduction as well as the larger effect of
biosecurity measures in the low-risk scenario reflects the
effect of lower contact frequencies as well as a lower
herd prevalence of the diseases. This effect is also seen
in both scenarios for the suckler herd, that had lower
frequencies for most contact types.
A high number of contacts may outweigh the effect of
a reduced risk for each contact, as seen when comparing
the scenarios and the different herds.
Farmers may adapt their routines based on knowledge
of geographical and temporal disease prevalence. When
using the model, this could be illustrated by lowering
the input value for herd prevalence. Moreover, farmers
can reduce risks by changing contact patterns or fo-
cusing biosecurity measures on the contacts with the
highest risk for their individual farm, depending on
production routines. This is reflected in the low-risk
scenarios, and could be used in a discussion with the
farmer by changing each individual input based on
what is feasible on his/her farm and then comparing
the outputs. Presenting the results in a diagram such
as Fig. 1 may be most useful for a stochastic model,
where the range in output can easily be demonstrated
and point estimates not given too much weight, thus
avoiding projection of a false image of certainty in
the results. To achieve the same illustrative effect in
a deterministic version of the model, the relevant in-
put values would need to be varied in many repeats
of the model, and all the different outputs shown in a
diagram.
Pigs
The results for the yearly risk of introduction of each
disease in each herd type in the different model versions
are shown in Table 6. For the bacterial pig diseases, esti-
mates of disease introduction via indirect transmission
routes were much lower than for the more transmissible
viral bovine diseases. Biosecurity measures as well as
changes in contact rates reduced the risk of introducing
these diseases. However, a high number of introduced live
animals in combination with a high herd prevalence made
the estimated probability of introduction of Mycoplasma
hyopneumoniae without biosecurity measures very high
for both scenarios in both herds. For dysentery, with a
much lower estimated herd prevalence, much lower prob-
abilities of introduction were seen for both scenarios in
both herds.
Most outputs from the stochastic model versions had
very wide ranges and skewed distributions. To reduce the
probability to the 5th percentile or the minimum output
value would require very strict application of all measures
in order to achieve the very highest effect of all such mea-
sures. If this is deemed realistic on a particular farm, input
parameters for the effect of the relevant biosecurity










Baseline No 100 (99.96–100) 98.85 (74.86–100)
Yes 99.99 (91.63–100) 65.70 (31.86–89.43)
Low-risk No 75.82 (19.09–99.21) 61.00 (13.37–96.05)
Yes 32.99 (5.83–76.20) 27.30 (4.72–66.55)
BCoV
Baseline No 100 (100–100) 99.86 (90.90–100)
Yes 100 (99.63–100) 85.35 (54.71–97.67)
Low-risk No 80.85 (22.91–99.54) 69.86 (17.30–98.15)
Yes 39.12 (7.57–80.60) 38.50 (7.36–79.44)
Model outputs for bovine respiratory syncytial virus (BRSV) and bovine
coronavirus (BCoV) in two example cattle herds, as calculated in a stochastic
model, based on two scenarios (baseline and low-risk contact patterns,
respectively), with and without application of biosecurity (quarantine for
new animals, protective clothes for visitors, hygiene lock for loading/unloading,
isolated deadstock collection area). Median result and 5th to 95th percentiles
(in brackets) are given
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measures could be changed accordingly and the resulting
changes in model outputs discussed with the farmer.
Adapting the pattern of live animal contacts in order
to reduce certain risks is also an important aspect, where
the stochastic outputs may be informative as a basis for
discussion. However, a manipulation of each input based
on possible changes in contact patterns and application
of biosecurity measures could also be used.
It should be noted that in particular for swine dysentery,
the results are only theoretically applicable to Swedish
herds since the disease has been eradicated from nucleus
and multiplying herds [20].
Factors affecting the results
The differences in output for each disease and each farm
type reflect the large differences in the number of con-
tacts as well as the differences in prevalence of the
specific diseases. These were the two most important
factors affecting the outcome of the models, with disease
prevalence being the most important. The most frequent
contact type and the estimated risk for this contact was
almost as important as disease prevalence when the ef-
fect of biosecurity measures was not included. When
this effect was included, logically, the size of the risk re-
duction by the biosecurity measure affecting the risk for
the most frequent contact type became important as
well.
The risk of introduction also depends largely on the
infectious agent. This is reflected in the different results
for the different diseases that, although all contagious,
have different probabilities of transmission via each con-
tact as well as different prevalence estimates. When ap-
plying biosecurity measures, disease prevalence was the
Fig. 1 Yearly risk of disease introduction in a fictitious beef suckler herd. Model outputs for bovine respiratory syncytial virus (BRSV) and bovine
coronavirus (BCV) as calculated in one stochastic (stoch) and one deterministic (determ) model based on two scenarios. (baseline and low-risk
contact patterns, respectively), with and without mitigating biosecurity (biosec) measures. For stochastic models, the 5th and 95th percentiles of
output is shown by the grey bar. Black dots represent median output values, whereas for deterministic models only fixed output values are shown










Baseline No 11.43 (2.88–31.30) 45.35 (5.66–70.00)
Yes 2.33 (0.20–4.92) 22.18 (2.69–35.75)
Low-risk No 8.17 (1.88–25.58) 26.32 (2.98–45.35)
Yes 1.18 % (0.10–2.52) 12.50 (1.37–22.03)
M. hyo
Baseline No 100 (98.37–100) 100 (100–100)
Yes 53.51 (17.20–85.03) 55.86 (18.34–87.56)
Low-risk No 99.99 (98.30–100) 100 (99.99–100)
Yes 54.24 (17.01–86.46) 38.12 (15.09–67.61)
Model outputs for swine dysentery (SD) and Mycoplasma hyopneumoniae (M.
hyo) in two example pig herds, as calculated in a stochastic model, based on
two scenarios (baseline and low-risk contact patterns, respectively), with and
without mitigating biosecurity (quarantine for new animals, protective clothes
for visitors, hygiene lock for loading/unloading, isolated deadstock collection
area). Median result and 5th to 95th percentiles (in brackets) are given
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single most important factor affecting the outcome. In
the presence of a regional disease control programme,
the risk is reduced for all herds. However, for some
herds biosecurity in the form of reduced/planned con-
tacts and specific on-farm biosecurity measures may be
needed to substantially affect the risk.
Model inputs
Input data based on scientific studies are usually prefera-
ble, but were not available in this case. It is very difficult
to use field studies for the assessment of the effect of sep-
arate biosecurity measures for separate diseases. Mean-
while, experimental studies will not provide data directly
applicable to the field situation. On the other hand, expert
elicitations can be quite resource demanding and there is
always a risk of bias. Still, expert opinion was used in this
study, making an effort to combine experience from the
field with literature data to obtain realistic estimates and
based on a structured discussion to avoid adjustment and
anchoring [23].
The very wide output ranges are mainly due to the
large range in the input values that in turn reflect the
uncertainty and/or variability of these estimates. For
example, variations in regional as well as individual
herd immunity affect both prevalence and risk of intro-
duction and applying the model to a specific region
would allow more precise prevalence figures. Some of
the uncertainty might be overcome by further studies
to obtain detailed data on which to calculate the prob-
ability of introduction via various routes in a specific
production system in a specific region. However, a lot
of the variation is probably due to the inherent variabil-
ity in biological systems as well as in human behaviour
that affects the probability of introducing infectious
agents via different contacts as well as the expected
mitigating effect of biosecurity measures. Hence, even
if uncertainty may be removed by further studies, the
range in some parameter inputs, particularly the effect
of biosecurity measures relying on the compliance of
many people, would still be wide due to variability. This
variation may be reduced, but not entirely eliminated,
by efforts to improve compliance, which is a crucial as-
pect of successful biosecurity. When using the model
on an individual farm, some of the input parameters
could be changed based on the assessment of how
strictly a biosecurity measure might be applied on this
particular farm.
The probability of disease introduction may have been
overestimated both in the input values and in the calcu-
lations, as it was assumed that a visit to an infected farm
would always lead to the estimated probability of intro-
duction (see Table 2). Moreover, each repeated sourcing
from the same herd was treated as a “new” source of an-
imals (as the herd’s disease status could change over
time). This may have resulted in unrealistically high
output figures. However, the exact risk figures are not
very interesting per se, it is the comparison between
outputs when manipulating some of the inputs that
may be useful for optimising biosecurity in an individ-
ual herd. The infectious agents used as examples in this
study could be replaced with others, if the individual
farmer or veterinarian believe other examples would be
more relevant. There is however no need to apply the
model to every conceivable disease that could threaten
the farm, as the purpose would be to identify the points
for improvement of the farm’s general biosecurity.
Thus, two examples of diseases that are present in the
region but not in the individual farm would suffice.
The rates of different contacts vary between farms
and thus these model inputs would need to be adjusted
for the individual farm. Studies on contact rates in
Swedish livestock holdings have shown large variations
depending on farm type [25]. Varying the number of
each specific contact did not prove meaningful for this
study, as it would have resulted in an even larger num-
ber of model versions. Therefore fixed scenarios reflect-
ing an average rate of contacts in each type of herd
versus an adaptation of contacts (as would be advised
for risk reduction) were used instead. The difference in
results between the baseline and the low-risk scenario
reflects the effect of reducing and adapting contacts in
place and time (sourcing animals from fewer herds
and/or during a period of lower disease prevalence).
As the purpose of the study was mainly to illustrate
possible effects of the measures included in most
recommendations for on-farm biosecurity, some con-
tacts and potential biosecurity measures were left out
for simplicity. However, potential biosecurity measures
could be added to the model and evaluated. When
adapting the model to a real farm, all contacts and
other routes of transmission could be included and esti-
mated for each disease of interest. On the other hand,
including the major risks and potential risk reduction
measures may be sufficient for the purpose of discussion
and information.
Usefulness of the model tool
The use of a deterministic model based on point esti-
mates may be preferable, as it is more user-friendly and
does not require any simulation software. However, as
seen in Fig. 1, outputs from a deterministic model do
not reflect variation and may lead to a false impression
of certainty with consequently exaggerated or minimised
expectations. In order to reflect the variability and un-
certainty in a deterministic model, many of the input
parameters would need to be varied in several scenarios
that could be discussed as regards feasibility and ex-
pected costs. With a stochastic model based on sampling
Lewerin et al. BMC Veterinary Research  (2015) 11:171 Page 8 of 10
from a distribution of inputs, the range of outputs as
well as the mean could be used as a basis for discussions
about the importance of compliance and the possibility
of achieving maximum effect of the different measures.
Probabilities and percentages are not easily interpreted
by most people [26]. However, illustrating the results in
a diagram may be more useful than simply obtaining
output figures. The usefulness of the tool depends both
on the farmer and the veterinary advisor and the models
would need to be adapted for the specific needs of each
situation.
Compliance with biosecurity protocols
Designing good biosecurity programmes is not enough,
there must be compliance in the field. There are indica-
tions that even audits and surveillance cameras are not
enough to preserve good biosecurity routines in the long
term [15] and that personality traits as well as education
and experience are important for compliance with biose-
curity protocols [27]. Financial incentives in the form of
demonstrated economic benefits are perceived as import-
ant motivators by some farmers [28] whereas monetary
sanctions may have the opposite effect [13]. Education
and information is regarded as a key factor to the applica-
tion of biosecurity routines. However, a sense of not being
able to prevent disease occurrence, or that disease intro-
duction is a random event beyond farmers’ control, can
make information efforts ineffective [29].
Improving on-farm biosecurity also has implications
for preventing outbreaks of exotic diseases. Most of
these diseases are highly contagious but the probability
of introduction still depends on many factors and may
be reduced by routine biosecurity measures [30–32].
Although farmers will most likely not be very interested
in preventing disease outbreaks that they believe may
never happen, or perceive is the responsibility of the
authorities [13, 33, 34], a perceived ability to prevent
the introduction of circulating disease has been associ-
ated with a positive attitude to on-farm biosecurity
measures [35]. The model presented here aims to pro-
vide farmers (and their veterinary advisors) with a sense
of being able to control disease introduction to their
own farm, as an incentive for improving compliance
with biosecurity recommendations.
Conclusion
The model tool proved useful for illustrating the risk of
introduction of endemic diseases and the mitigating effect
of biosecurity measures on farm level. It may be useful in
the field if on-farm input data could be limited to farm-
specific contact data and all other necessary parameters
were already provided for selected disease examples. The
theoretic exercise of working with the model may aid vet-
erinary advisors in understanding farm-specific risks and
in motivating farmers to improve biosecurity, as it can be
tailored to each farmer’s needs and preferences.
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